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ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
A DYNAMIC ANALYSIS
Amitrajeet A. Batabyal

ABSTRACT

I construct a dynamic model of the environmental policy formulation process in a
stylized developing country (DC). N ext, I analyze the employment and output effects of three
pollution control policies. These policies embody different assumptions about the DC
government's ability to commit to its announced course of action. I characterize the timepath of
the government's policy variable, and then I show that optimality calls for an activist policy,
irrespective of the length of time to which the government can commit to its announced policy.
However, the effects of this activist policy depend fundamentally on the government's period of
commitment.

JEL Classifications Numbers: 020, Q20, D90

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES :
ADYNAMIC ANALYSIS 1

1. Introduction

In recent times, there has been considerable discussion on the general question of
environmental policy in developing countries (DCs). There is general agreement among
scholars, such as Bhalla (1992), Mehmet (1995), and Renner (1992), that a concerted attempt
must be made by DC governments to design and implement policies which generate
employment. However, in order to protect the environment, these same governments will also
have to implement appropriate pollution control policies. The developed country experience
with pollution control policies-see Christainsen and Tietenberg (198 5)-tells us that these
policies will often have a negative effect on employment. Consequently, DC governments may
find it difficult to institute policies which ensure that the twin goals of employment creation and
environmental protection are met. Given this state of affairs, concern has been expressed about a
DC government's ability to realistically commit to environmental policy for any reasonable
length of time. Indeed, some observers have noted that in the face of pressing employment
creation needs, IDC governments may not be serious about the question of environmental
protection. Alternately put, although DC governments may initiate the process of establishing
pollution control policies, their will to continue with such policies is likely to be limited.
Despite the importance of the issues discussed in the previous paragraph, the

I*Batabyal: Department of Economics, 3530 University Boulevard, Utah State University, Logan, Utah
84322-3530. Tel.: 8011797-2314 , Fax: 8011797-2701, E-mail: batabya1@b202.usu.edu. Ithank Larry Karp and a
referee for their input; I alone am responsible for the output. I acknowledge fmancial support from the Utah
Agricultural Experiment Station, Utah State University, Logan, Utah 84322-4810, by way of project UTA 024.
Approved as journal paper No. 5017.

employment/environment question in DCs has received very little attention in the literature.2 As
such, the primary objective of this paper is to construct and analyze an employment driven
dynamic model of the environmental policy formulation process in a stylized DC. The
secondary objective of this paper is to show how the DC government's optimal course of action
is closely related to its ability to commit to its announced policy.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I describe my theoretical
framework in detail. In section 3, I analyze a dynamic model of the conduct of environmental
policy by the government of a stylized DC, under three different assumptions about the ability of
this government to commit to its announced policy. In section 4, I offer concluding comments.

2. The Theoretical Framework

My model is in the tradition of papers such as Mussa (1978), Pindyck (1982), and
particularly Karp and Paul (1994), which study the implications of government/ regulatory
policies in a dynamic framework. I shall use the specific factors model to study a small
two-sector trading DC. In order to stress the employment aspect of the underlying story, I shall
assume that the DC economy is dualistic. In other words, the two DC sectors consist of a
modern, high wage, environmentally intensive sector in which production causes pollution. The
/

second sector is the traditional, low wage, environmentally benign sector in which there is no
pollution.
In order to earn higher wages, workers migrate from the traditional sector to the modern
sector. This migration, which is unplanned from the perspective of the DC government, results
in increased employment in the modern sector, increased production, and hence greater

2See Lekakis (1991) and Mehmet (1995) for a more detailed corroboration ofthis claim.

pollution.3 Although workers, in their role as consumers, are adversely affected by pollution,
they do not factor pollution into their migration decisions. As a result, the marginal migrant pays
less than the marginal social cost of migration. In other words, in the absence of governmental
policy, migration takes place too quickly and hence there is excessive pollution in the economy.
In this situation, the first best policy is to tax pollution directly. However, in many DCs the
government simply does not possess the wherewithal to tax pollution directly. As such, in this
paper I shall assume that the DC government operates in a second best environment in which it
controls pollution by means of a production tax.
Initially, the DC economy is in disequilibrium, owing to the fact that the government
does nothing to correct distorted producer incentives and hence ensure environmental protection.
A movement toward equilibrium requires a reduction in the production of the polluting good
over time. Alternately put, a move toward equilibrium involves slowing the rate at which
workers migrate from the traditional sector to the modern sector. I assume that workers have
rational expectations, which is equivalent to assuming that they have perfect foresight in this
deterministic model.
Each sector of the DC produces a single good using a fixed factor and a mobile factor
called labor,

wi~h

decreasing returns to scale. Superscripts on production variables will denote

the sector and superscripts on consumption variables will denote the agent. Subscripts will
denote partial derivatives. L i(t), i = 1,2, is the labor employed by the

jth

continuous. Let L denote the DC's total labor endowment, i.e. , L 1( t)

+

sector at time t; time is

L 2( t )

=

L . Good 2 is

the polluting good. All my subsequent results are independent of whether good 2 is the export

3In addition to having an adverse enviromnental impact, unplanned migration can be problematic in other
ways as well. For more on this, see Swaminathan (1993 ).

good or the import competing good. The government's policy variable is a production tax, -e(t),
which is levied on the production of good 2. Following Dixit and Norman (1980) and Karp and
Paul (1994), I shall use duality theory to model consumption and production decisions in the DC.
The production function of the ith sector, i = 1,2, isj(Li) and the corresponding revenue function
is Ri(pi, Li) . As is well known, ~ and R; denote the output supply of good i and the wage in
sector i, respectively.4 Let the world price of good 2 be p = p2jpI, where pI = 1. Further, let

L 2 = L , and let L 1

=

L- L.

There is a continuum of identical workers in each sector of the DC economy and a single
capitalist is the residual claimant. I shall assume that all agents have homothetic preferences.
Then, following Dixit and Norman (1980, p. 326), the expenditure function of agent},} = 1,2,3,
can be written as E(l,p,u')

=

rJE(p), where E(P) is the unit expenditure function and rJ is agent

}' s real income. National income for the DC is U

==

(L - L) U 1

+ LU 2 +

U 3 , where the

superscript 3 refers to the capitalist.
Let met) denote the private value of migration for any worker at time t, i.e., met) denotes
the discounted value of the wage differential between the high wage polluting sector and the low
wage nonpolluting sector. Mathematically

111(t)

=

Je -r(S - t){R~(e) - R;(e )}ds,

(1)

t

where r is the discount rate. The integral equation in (1) can be converted into a differential
equation. This equation is

(2)
A worker will migrate to the modern sector if and only if the private value of migration,

met), is at least as high as the private cost of migration. However, because workers do not factor

4For more on the properties of these dual functions, see Dixit and Norman (1980, chapter 2).

pollution into their migration decisions, the social cost of migration is not equal to the private
cost of migration. Let the social cost of migration be quadratic, i. e. , C(L) = a( L)2 I where

a > O. The reader will note that I am thinking of migration as the change in the labor stock.
Now because the average social cost, aL,is less than the marginal social cost, 2a LI in the
absence of governmental intervention, migration for high wage employment takes place too
rapidly, thereby increasing environmental degradation. To capture the fact that the private cost
of migration is lower than the social cost, suppose that workers base their migration decision on
a fraction 0, OE(O,l), of the marginal social cost

2aL.

Alternately put, the migrating workers do

not internalize the environmental externality stemming in part from their decision to migrate.
N ow equating the private value of migration with the private cost of migration, an equation for
the dynamics of labor migration can be obtained. This equation is

L

=

nt/2ao.

(3)

Since this DC economy is open and because I am not allowing for the possibility of international
borrowing, in equilibrium, trade must be balanced. That is,

The first term in this "balance of trade deficit" expression refers to consumption expenditures.
Equation (3) tells us that C(L)

=

nt 2/ 2a0 2. Hence, the second term of equation (4) denotes the

J

social cost of pollution. The third and the fourth terms give the value of production, and the fifth
term denotes tax revenues. The tax revenues are redistributed in lump sum fashion.
I shall be particularly interested in studying the DC government's optimal dynamic
environmental policy under three assumptions about its ability to commit to a particular course
of action. In the first case, the government commits to a tax trajectory for an infinite period of
time. The reader should interpret this infinite period of commitment as a case in which

environmental protection is enshrined in the DC constitution.5 When this is done, it does not
matter which government is in office, because the dictates of the constitution will have to be
followed . In the second case, the DC government commits to a tax trajectory for a finite period
of time. This finite period of commitment is more reasonable, and this finite period should be
thought of as the length of time during which a particular government is in office.
Unfortunately, in both these cases, the optimal tax policy is dynamically inconsistent. That is,
the government announces a tax trajectory at time t =

o. However, at some time E > 0, the

government will want to deviate from the trajectory that it announced at t = O. As a result, the
government's announced policy at time t = 0 will not be credible. This means that forward
looking workers will not believe that the government will actually carry through with its initially
announced policy, and hence this policy will fail to accomplish its objectives.
Since the credibility of governmental policy has been an important issue in many
developing countries, a priori, it would seem necessary to study the implications of the DC
government following a dynamically consistent course of action. 6 This is the third case that I
shall study. In this scenario, the government commits to a tax trajectory for an infinitesimal
period of time. In the limiting case in which the period of commitment approaches zero, the
government's tax policy is time consistent. This completes my discussion of the theoretical
I

framework. I now turn to the DC government's problem when it can commit to its tax policy for
an arbitrarily long period of time.

5Ifthe DC in question were India, this period would be 1976 . This is because until 1976, environmental
protection did not figure anywhere in the Indian constitution. See Batabyal (1993) for further details.
6Recall the section 1 discussion about the concern as to the lack of commitment in DC governmental
policies. In this connection, also see Fanelli, Frenkel, and Rozenwurcel (1 992).

3a. Environmental Policy with Perfect Commitment

In this case, the DC government is able to make a binding commitment and choose its tax
trajectory over (0,00) at t = O. In the language of control theory, this is the government's open
loop tax policy. The open loop pollution tax is a function of calendar time only. Workers have
perfect foresight and they are forward looking. As discussed earlier, because the economy is in
disequilibrium at t

=

0, the initial value of L, I( 0)

=

La' does not equal the steady state value of

labor in the polluting sector of the economy. It is important to note that the private value of
migration at any time t, met), is determined by the current and the future values of the tax. In
other words, the constraint represented by equation (2) is a jump state constraint. 7 This means
that the initial value of m, m(O), is endogenous to the problem. The reader should note that this
feature of the model makes the government's problem a nonstandard control problem. In this
setting, the government's objective is to solve
max

u,'tJ e -rsUds ,

(5)

a
subject to equations (2), (3), and (4), with initial condition L(O) = La . The current value
Hamiltonian for this problem is
H = U - A [UE( P) + { 111 2 /4
1

ao

2

}-

R \. ) - R 2(

• ) + 1"

Rl\ •)]+ 0 1{111 / 2cxo }

(6)

2

+ O 2{nn + R2 ( .) - R2 ( • ) },

where A is the Lagrange multiplier on constraint (4), and oland

O2

are the costate variables

corresponding to constraints (3) and (2), respectively. The first-order necessary conditions are

A

=

l/E(p),

(7)
(8)

7Many problems in economics are characterized by the existence of jump states. In monetary economics,
the exchange rate is generally a jump state because it is affected by current interest rates and agents ' expectations of
the future money supply. For more on jump state constraints, see Batabyal (1996a, 1996b), Karp and Newbery
(1993), and Karp and Paul (1994).

(9)

and
(10)

current private value of migration, and h(.) denotes the sum of the slopes of the marginal product
of labor in the two sectors. The reader should note that f(.) =

a{-d (. )} I aL

< O.

My main interest lies in characterizing the optimal pollution tax trajectory and the
magnitude of the optimal pollution tax. To this end, denote steady state values by the superscript
S. Then from equation (3), it follows that m S = O. From equation (2), I get d s( . ) = O.

Equation (10) implies that

~

= [-}..

q = O. From equation (8), it follows that

{,rR11 - 2R12}1 R~l] S, From equation (9), I get ~ = [-}.. -rR122Ih] s. Setting these last
2

two expressions equal, I get ~ = [2R1 hi { R121 h - R122R 221 }] s . From equation (8), it follows that
2

2
2
2
-r(t) = [{ 2).( t )R1 - 02( t )R21} I{}..( t )R11}]. Because m(O) is free, as Simaan and Cruz (1973)
have noted, the appropriate boundary condition for 02 is oiO) = O. In other words, the DC
government chooses its tax trajectory in such a way so that the social shadow value of m is zero

2
at the beginning of the program. Using 02(0) = 0, it follows that -r(0) = 2R121 R11 . I can now
state

Proposition 1, Case (i): Suppose that the revenue function in sector 2 is separable in its
arguments. Then the optimal program with perfect commitment involves setting . Case (ii) :
Suppose that the supply function for good 2 is linear, upward sloping, and that the cross partial
derivatives of the sector 2 revenue function are positive. Then the optimal program with perfect
s
commitment sets -r( 0) > -r > O. Case (iii): Suppose that the sector 2 revenue function is
arbitrary. Then optimality calls for setting -r(0) > ~ > 0 , as long as

Proof, Case (i): Separability of the revenue function implies that R:2 = R~l = O. Substituting
this into the expressions for 'teO), 't(t), and 'ts, the claimed result follows . Case (ii): If the supply
function of good 2 is linear and upward sloping, then

R121

is constant. Using this fact along with

~22 > 0 R 221 > 0 in the tax expressions above, the claimed result follows. Case (iii): It is easy
I

'teO) > 'ts > 0 .•

Proposition 1 describes the nature of the DC government's optimal dynamic policy under
certain specific conditions. Under the sufficient case (i) condition, there are no price or labor
interaction effects. Consequently, the government's optimal course of action is to set a pollution
tax that is constant over the entire length of the program. On the other hand, under the sufficient
case (ii) and the necessary and sufficient case (iii) conditions, the optimal policy involves
beginning with a "bang." In these two cases, the DC government moves toward an equilibrium
by starting with a large pollution tax. It then gradually lowers this tax to the steady state level.
Note that the government's open loop tax policy calls for an activist course of action. In other
words, it is typically not optimal to set a zero tax at any point in the program. The intuitive
reason for this is as follows. In this open loop case, there are no welfare losses from being
}

unable to commit, because the open loop tax policy incorporates perfect commitment. As such,
the case for doing nothing, which potentially arises when the government cannot commit, is
ruled out. Hence, the government corrects for the domestic distortion, and its tax policy is
activist.
While proposition 1 provides conditions for a constant and a declining tax trajectory,
these are not the only possible trajectories. If the conditions described in proposition 1 do not

hold, it is possible for the pollution tax to exhibit more complex dynamic behavior. Specifically,
it is possible for the tax to exhibit nonmonotonic behavior. This tells us that the pursuit of open
loop policies can lead to taxes which exhibit complicated dynamic behavior.
If the DC government's optimal tax policy, as described in proposition 1, is believed by
all agents in the economy, particularly by the migrating workers, then this policy will achieve its
objectives. That is, the pollution tax will reduce output and employment in sector 2 and slow the
rate of migration from the nonpolluting sector 1 to the polluting sector 2. However, these
objectives will not be met because the government will have an incentive to deviate from the
policy that it announced at t = 0. To see this, note that for any initial value of L, L(O)

* LS , the

optimal initial shadow value ofm(t), 0iO), is zero. However, because 0 < 1 on the announced
tax trajectory,

O2

* 0.

As a result, at any time

E

> 0, the government will want to deviate from the

tax trajectory it announced at t = 0, and announce a new trajectory. In other words, the
government's open loop tax policy is dynamically inconsistent. This means that unless there is
some mechanism by which the DC government can be bound to its initially announced tax
trajectory, this government will fail to achieve its initially announced employment and
environmental objectives. 8
From a practical perspective, this case of perfect commitment is clearly implausible
}

because no government can realistically be expected to commit to its policy for an infinite period
of time. Consequently, I now analyze the case in which the DC government is able to commit to
its announced policy at t = 0, for a finite period of time only. This is the limited commitment
case.

8The extent to which the government will fail to achieve its objectives depends on the nature and the
direction of deviation from the initially announced tax policy.

3b. Environmental Policy with Limited Commitment

Given that governments are in office for a finite period of time, the most reasonable
period of commitment would seem to correspond to the length of time during which a particular
government is in office. As such, I now study the case of limited commitment in which the
government commits to a policy for TEffi.++ time periods.
When the period of commitment is finite, an analysis of the equilibrium trajectory of the
pollution tax is made complex because the resulting equilibrium depends on the manner in which
agents form their expectations. If migrating workers base their expectations of future taxes on
the history of taxes, then multiple equilibria are possible. As such, there is a sort of "generic
indeterminacy" to the outcome of the imposition of the pollution tax. To eliminate this
indeterminacy, I shall restrict attention to smooth Markov perfect equilibria. By Markov I, mean
that the agents' decision rules at any time t, depending only on the current value of the state, i.e.,
the stock of labor, and not on the manner in which the current state was reached. A candidate for
an equilibrium is said to be perfect if this candidate is an equilibrium for any possible subgame,
i.e., for any possible level of the stock of labor. In particular, whether or not some agents have
deviated from their equilibrium strategies in the past, the continuance of these strategies
represents equilibrium behavior on the part of all the agents involved. 9 From a practical
standpoint, the Markov assumption is useful because it makes the DC government's equilibrium
tax policy insensitive to agents' mistakes.
With this restriction of Markov perfection, the equilibrium that emerges when the
government makes a commitment for Ttime periods can be characterized. At time periods
9Markov perfect equilibria are sometimes also known as strong Markov perfect equilibria. The word
"strong" emphasizes the fact that current decisions are based only on the current state and not on actions undertaken
in any previous time period.

0, T, 2T, 3T, . .. , successive governments choose their own tax trajectories. That is, at each iT,
i = 0,1, ... , the

ith

government completes its term in office, and a new government chooses its tax

trajectory for the next Ttime periods. At the end of Ttime periods, each government bequeaths
L r, the current labor stock, to its successor government. This government then pursues its

environmental policy for the next T time periods, and so on.
With this interpretation of the limited commitment case, let V(L) be the value of the
government's program when its period of commitment is T periods and when the initial level of
labor in the polluting sector isL . Now, the government solves
T

VeL)

==

max't,u je-rtUdf +e -rTV(LT ),

(11)

o
subject to equations (2), (3), and (4). Note that V(Lr) is a bequest function. This function
denotes the value of the labor stock bequeathed by an arbitrary government to its successor.
Also note that problem (11) is the same as the problem described in section 3a, with the
exception that the government's period of commitment is now T as opposed to infinity. This
means that the boundary conditions at the horizon of the program will be different, although the
first-order necessary conditions themselves remain as in equations (7) through (10).
As in section 3a, the fact that m(O) is free tells us that it is optimal to choose the tax
trajectory so that 02(0)

=

0. Using this last condition in equation (8), I get t( 0) = [2R12j R}l] .

}

To determine 1"(1), letM(L) be the equilibrium current value ofm, which is determined by the
solution to equation (11).10 In my case, I can write V( L)

q. }.

==

V{ L,M(L)} for some function

At the beginning of a specific time period iT, i = 0,1 , .. ., it is clear that 0ii1)

Further, the assumed smoothness of the value function gives 02

=

av laM

=

0.

(Kamien and

IOThe properties of this endogenous function of the state have been discussed elsewhere and hence I shall
omit an elaborate discussion. For further details, see Karp and Newbery (1991) or Karp and Paul (1994).

Schwartz, 1991, p. 165). That is, the social shadow value of Mis equal to the marginal value of

M in the bequest. Finally, the transversality condition for
this condition in equation (8), I get -r(T)

=

02

is 0iT) = av/ aM = O. Using

[2R 12/R 121]. I can now state

Proposition 2, Case (i): Suppose that the sector 2 revenue function is separable in its arguments.
Then the optimal program with limited commitment has 0 < 'teO) = 't(T) = 't(t), tt:(O, T) .

Case (ii): Suppose that the sector 2 revenue function is arbitrary. Then the optimal program
with limited commitment has 0 < 't( 0) = 't( T)

=1=

't( t) , 1£( 0, T).

Proof, Case (i): Separability of the revenue function implies that R122

=

R2~

=

O. Substituting

this into the expressions for 'teO), 't(t), and 'tel), the claimed result follows. Case (ii): The
expressions for 'teO) and 't(l) tell us that these two taxes are positive and that they are not
functions of the mixed partial derivatives of the sector 2 revenue function. As contrasted to this,

't(t) is a function of the mixed partial derivatives of the revenue function. Hence, we have
0< 'teO)

=

't(T)

=1=

't(t), tE(O, T) . •

Under the conditions specified in proposition 2, an optimal program once again calls for
an activist pollution control policy. The DC government sets a positive pollution tax even
though it can commit to its announced policy for only a finite period of time. A comparison of
the first case in propositions 1 and 2 tells us that when the sector 2 revenue function is separable
in its arguments, whether commitment is perfect or limited has no bearing on the government's
optimal course of action. Put differently, the separability of the revenue function is a sufficient
condition for the nature of commitment not to matter. As contrasted to this, a comparison of
case (iii) of proposition 1 and case (ii) of proposition 2 tells us that the timepaths of the pollution
tax in these two programs are quite different when the revenue function is arbitrary. In
particular, while the perfect commitment case calls for starting with a high tax and then lowering

this tax to its steady state value, the limited commitment case calls for equalizing the tax at the
beginning and at the end of the program.
Note the important role played by the endogenous function of the state, M(L) . This
function performs the role of an "expectations" function. When the DC government solves its
optimization problem taking this expectations function as given, the optimal tax trajectory results
in an initial value of m, m(O), which satisfies In( 0)

=

M {L( 0) }. That is, in equilibrium, every

agent's point expectations are fulfilled. Further, this same optimal tax trajectory results in a
terminal value of m such that

av(·)/ aM

= 02 (T) =

o. As indicated earlier, at the horizon of

the program, the shadow value of the state M, equals the marginal value of M in the bequest
function, and these two values equal zero.
While this limited commitment scenario is quite plausible, this equilibrium too is
dynamically inconsistent. To see why, think of the Markov perfect case just studied as one in
which an infinite sequence of governments conduct environmental policy during a time period of
length T. Further, denote the tenure of each government in this infinite sequence by ~T} ~= o .. As
long as T> 0, each government behaves consistently at each i but not within a period of length T.
Put differently, the government begins its tenure in office with the best of intentions, but some
time later, it will want to renege on the policy it announced at the beginning of its tenure. As a
J

result, forward looking agents will not believe that the government will actually carry through
with its initially announced policy. In turn, this means that the government will not succeed in
accomplishing its policy objectives. Pollution and employment in sector 2 will not be reduced,
and the rate of migration from the traditional sector to the modern sector will not be slowed.
So far, I have shown that the dynamic inconsistency of the government's optimal tax
policy is responsible for the nonattainment of the DC government' s employment and

environmental goals. This suggests a need to make the government's policy dynamically
consistent. I now proceed to do this by studying the case in which the DC government commits
to a specific tax policy for an infinitesimal period of time. In this setting, I shall be particularly
interested in the limiting Markov perfect equilibrium in which the government's period of
commitment shrinks to zero. II

3c. Environmental Policy with No Commitment

Intuitively, one would expect the Markov perfect equilibrium to depend on the
government's period of commitment. That is, one would expect the government's equilibrium
tax to be a function of two opposing forces . The first force, the presence of pollution, would
appear to necessitate an activist policy designed to correct for this domestic distortion. The
second force, the government's inability to commit to its tax trajectory, would appear to favor
the status quo. Given this scenario, the relevant policy question is this: Are there circumstances
in which the welfare loss from being unable to commit dominates the welfare gain from reducing
pollution, so that it is optimal to do nothing?12
In order to study the limiting case, I shall follow Karp and N ewbery (1993) and Karp and
Paul (1994) and begin with a discrete stage formulation of the DC government's problem. Let
the government's period of commitment, and the length of each stage, be

E.

Further, suppose

that all agents act at the beginning of each time period of length E . The state constraints facing
the government at any time t can be written as
(12)
llFor an alternate approach to the construction of dynamically consistent policies, see Batabyal (l996a,
1996b).
12In this context, doing nothing refers to the case in which the DC government sets a zero tax.

and
(13)
where dt (~)

==

R;(.) - R2\ · ) . In equation (12), (In/ 2rxO)E represents the number of

migrants in a period of length E. Similarly, in equation (13), -d t (·)E denotes the value of the
flow of the wage differential in a time period of length
commitment

E,

E . 13

At time t, with period of

the government's dynamic programming problem is
(14)

subj ect to equations (12) and (13) . Note that the function D( e) represents the "balance of trade
deficit" constraint embodied in equation ( 4), that mt +€

=

M( Lt ) , and that the government takes

the functionM(e) as given. After some algebra, the first-order necessary condition W.r.t. -r can
be written as
2

2

A['tR l l -2R l - {aD/aL t}{dLt/d-r}- {aD/alnt }{dm t /d-r}]E

-e - r€ {dV/dLt }{dL/d-r} = O.

(15)

In order to simplify equation (15) further, it will be necessary to differentiate equations (12) and
( 13 ) totally. This gives

dL/d-r

=

{E/2ao }{dm/d-r },

(16)

and

{ht(·)E -e -r€M/(Lt)}{dLt/d-r}

,

+

{dm/d-r}

=

{adt/a-r}E.

(17)

Now substitute for d~/ d-r from equation (16) into equation (17), and then simplify the resulting
equation. This gives dln/ d-r~ O( E) . Similarly, substituting for dm/d-r from equation (17) into
equation (16) and then simplifying the resulting equation yields dL/d-r ~O(E) . Now divide both
sides of equation (15) by
let

E -.

E,

use the preceding two results regarding dm/d-r and dL/d-r , and then

O. The limiting first-order necessary condition becomes

13Equations (12) and (13 ) represent constraints (3) and (2) in discrete fonn.

(18)
This leads to

Proposition 3: In an optimal program in which the government's period of commitment
the limiting Markov Perfect equilibrium tax is positive and equals

Proof Since A > 0, equation (18) can be simplified to yield

l' =

2R12 /

E -.

0,

Rl~ .

[2R1 /Rl~] > O. •
2

Proposition 3 provides us with an answer to the policy question posed at the beginning of
this section. This proposition tells us that even when the government displays no commitment to
its tax policy, the welfare loss from being unable to commit is never as large as the welfare gain
from reducing pollution. Consequently, the optimal pollution tax is positive. Put differently, the
passive aspect (do nothing) of governmental policy is dominated by the activist aspect (control
pollution). This explains why the limiting pollution tax is positive.
While proposition 3 and the discussion preceding it provide a rigorous characterization of
the limiting pollution tax, the same characterization can be obtained intuitively. To see this,
recall the discussion of the government's optimal policy immediately preceding the statement of
proposition 2. According to this discussion, 1'(iT)

=

2R12/R121' i

=

0,1,43, ... . Now note that

by choosing T sufficiently small, the equilibrium tax trajectory can be kept arbitrarily close to its
initial value which equals 2R12/R121' Not surprisingly, this is also the value of the limiting
pollution tax.
This limiting case involves continuous revision of the pollution tax by the DC
government. When the government revises its policy continually, the resulting policy is
dynamically consistent. In other words, the government' s tax policy is credible. Hence, this
policy will be successful in reducing pollution in the modern sector and in slowing the rate at
which workers migrate from the traditional sector to the modern sector.

As Karp and Newbery (1993) have noted, the payoff to an agent is monotonic in his
period of commitment. In the context of this paper, this means that reducing the government's
period of commitment can never make the government better off. With this observation and the
previous discussion of policy efficacy in mind, it is possible to rank the three policies in terms of
(i) the government's preference and (ii) the policy's ability to achieve its goals. From the DC
government's perspective, the most desirable policy is the open loop policy; this policy allows
the government to make a commitment for an infinite period of time. The second best policy is
the Markov perfect tax policy with a finite period of commitment. The least desirable policy is
the limiting Markov perfect tax policy. As contrasted to this ranking, the ranking in terms of
goal attainment is exactly the opposite. The limiting Markov perfect tax policy is credible; as
such, this policy will be able to reduce pollution. The other two policy instruments are not
credible; hence they will fail to achieve the government's environmental goals. Of these two
noncredible policies, the finite commitment Markov perfect tax is more plausible. This
discussion highlights the DC government's basic dilemma. The policy which results in the
highest payoff to the government is the one that is least desirable from the standpoint of goal
attainment and social welfare.

4. Conclusions

In this paper I used the specific factors model to study a stylized and dualistic DC
economy in which there is domestic pollution. Next, I studied the conduct of environmental
policy by the DC government under three assumptions about this government's ability to commit
to its announced policy. A number of important policy conclusions emerge.
First, the analysis of this paper provides some answers to hitherto little studied questions

about the employment/environment interface in DCs. In particular, the analysis tells us that as
long as the private cost of migration is less than the social cost of migration (0 < 1) successful
environmental policy involves continuous revision of the relevant policy instrument (tax).
Second, the analysis shows that doing nothing, i.e. , setting a zero tax, is typically not an
optimal course of action. I demonstrated that although the nature of the underlying equilibrium
depends on the government's ability to commit to its announced policy, the welfare loss from the
inability to commit does not dominate the welfare gain from reducing pollution. As such, an
optimal course of action generally requires that the pollution tax be positive.
Third, the analysis points to the unrealistic nature of dynamically inconsistent,
particularly open loop policies. Such policies cannot be believed by forward looking agents with
rational expectations. Hence, such agents will successfully thwart the DC government's policy
objectives. This stands in sharp contrast to the limiting Markov perfect tax policy which is
dynamically consistent. In this case, the equilibrium is characterized by an endogenous function
of the state and the government continuously revises its tax trajectory. Continuous revision
implies credibility, and, in turn, this means that the government's environmental policy will
achieve its intended objectives.
Fourth, there is a basic tradeoff between policy credibility and policy payoff Credible
policies yield a lower payoff than do noncredible policies. This observation provides a possible
explanation as to why many DC governments are loath to use dynamically consistent policies
which involve continuous policy revision.
The analysis contained in this paper can be extended in a number of directions. One such
extension would involve making the migration equation, equation 3, depend on m and the tax '"C.
This would permit an analysis of policy when the government's tax has a direct effect on

migration decisions. Preliminary research along this line suggests that the DC government's
optimal course of action can be quite sensitive to the manner in which the migration decision is
modeled.
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